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YOU ARE THE FATHER!
AN ARGUMENT FOR COURT-ORDERED
PRENATAL PATERNITY TESTING AND CHILD
SUPPORT IN TENNESSEE
Michael R. Stooksbury1
I. INTRODUCTION
As long as the concept of monogamy has existed,
humans have looked for ways to escape it. Unfortunately,
children, a natural consequence of sexual activity,2 are often
harmed by the lack of a supportive family structure in singlefamily households.3 To correct this, Tennessee courts often
order child support from one parent to another using the

Michael is a third-year student at LMU Duncan School of Law, where he
is the Executive Articles Editor for the LMU Law Review. He would like
to thank his friends, family, and the attorneys and staff at Davis Law Firm
for their guidance and proof-reading. Michael would also like to thank his
lovely wife Emily for her support and encouragement, especially
considering this project took much of his time in the months preceding
their wedding.
2 See generally DR. JILLIAN ROBERTS, WHERE DO BABIES C OME FROM?
(2015).
3 Isabel V. Sawhill, Are Children Raised With Absent Fathers Worse Off?,
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provisions provided in the Tennessee Code.4 As a result, this
is why paternity determinations are an important court
function. One aspect courts have neglected, however, is child
support for expecting mothers during pregnancy. Prenatal
child support for expecting mothers would help alleviate
some prenatal costs and make the father invested in the
child before birth. Unfortunately, these equitable prenatal
outcomes are impossible under Tennessee law for unwed
mothers, mothers with multiple partners, or fathers who
suspect infidelity. That is why this paper advocates for
passing legislation allowing courts to order prenatal
paternity tests and prenatal child support.
This paper first discusses the history of paternity
testing. Second, it analyzes the current legal state with a
focus on Tennessee. Third, it argues for court-ordered
prenatal paternity testing. Finally, it includes proposed
legislation allowing the court to order prenatal paternity
testing.

II. HISTORY OF PATERNITY TESTING
There are two types of children who need paternity
established: (1) the child born out of adultery and (2) the
child born out-of-wedlock.5 Both children are “illegitimate,”
and their difference lies in the mother’s marital status.6
Children of adultery are born to a woman married to a man
other than the child’s father.7 On the other hand, out-ofwedlock children are born to mothers who are not married.8
An out-of-wedlock child was traditionally called a “bastard”
child.9

A. PATERNITY IN THE PRE-DNA-TESTING WORLD

See generally TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-5-101 to -3111 (2021) (explaining
how courts should endeavor to reach decisions in the realms of child and
spousal support).
5 E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future
Paternity Action, 7 J. OF L. AND HEALTH 1, 8 (1993). See also Leviticus 20:10
(King James).
6 Shapiro et al., supra note 5.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
4
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The ancient world dealt with illegitimate children
rather bluntly—pregnant, unmarried, or adulterous women
met execution.10 After execution, paternity no longer needed
to be established. However, this is not to say there were no
illegitimate children, but those who were, particularly in
Rome, had no rights to child support or succession.11 Roman
children were considered filius nullius, Latin for a child of no
one, and could only acquire these rights through adoption. 12
English common law adopted the concept of filius
nullius, and out-of-wedlock children could not seek child
support from either parent.13 Instead, the common law
relegated these children to the status of the destitute.14
English parishes and boroughs often assisted these
children.15 The drain that out-of-wedlock children put on the
welfare state of Renaissance England prompted Parliament
to pass the Poor Law Act of 1576, which authorized the
punishment of both parents of the child and required both
parties to make payments to the system.16 This Act finally
made it relevant for a court to determine a child’s paternity.
English children of adultery, however, had a slightly
different problem. Since there was no way to test a child’s
paternity, children of married women were presumed to be
fathered by the woman’s husband.17 This presumption was
so strong that it was unable to be challenged in any way.18
Lord Coke, a legal scholar of the period, summed it up well
in 1628:
But we terme them all by the name of bastards
that are borne out of lawfull marriage. By the
Common Law, if the husband be within the
foure seas, that is, within the jurisdiction of
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Judy Dahl, We Presume Too Much: Abandoning the Presumption of
Legitimacy in Certain Adoption Matters, 26 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 693, 698 (2020).
18 Id.
10
11
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the king of England, if the wife hath issue, no
proofe is to be admitted to prove the childe a
bastard (for in that case, filiatio non potest
probari) unless the husband hath an apparent
impossibilitie of procreation; as if the husband
be but eight yeers old, or under the age of
procreation, such issue is Bastard, albeit he be
born within marriage. But if the issue be born
within a month or a day after marriage,
between parties of full lawfull age, the childe
is legitimate.19
This rule even kept mothers from testifying to their
child’s paternity.20 Due to its draconian nature, this
presumption, along with common law discriminations
against illegitimate children, kept children from establishing
relationships with and inheriting from their rightful
fathers.21 The English courts, however, had their reasons,
stated as follows:
[t]he primary policy rationale underlying the
common law’s severe restrictions on rebuttal
of the presumption appears to have been an
aversion to declaring children illegitimate,
thereby depriving them of rights of
inheritance and succession and likely making
them wards of the state. A secondary policy
concern was the interest in promoting the
“peace and tranquillity [sic] of States and
families . . . .”22
The presumption spread to the United States through
their colonial connection and absorbed into the common
law.23 By the 1930s, the presumption had become
rebuttable.24 Still, Judge Cardozo, writing for the New York
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES
ENGLAND 244 (London, Co. of Stationers 1628).
20 Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591; 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
21 See Dahl, supra note 17.
22 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (citations
omitted).
23 See Dahl, supra note 17.
24 Id.
19
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Court of Appeals, held that “the presumption will not fail
unless common sense and reason are outraged by a holding
that it abides.”25
B. “BALD EAGLE” EVIDENCE
Establishing Paternity before DNA was an extremely
fact-based inquiry—those facts being the child’s physical
attributes compared to the putative father.26 This evidence
was called “bald eagle” evidence.27 Ancient Carthage can first
attribute this sort of inquiry, where a special committee
examined children once they reached the age of two.28 If they
did not closely enough resemble their father, Ancient
Carthaginians killed them.29
English Courts allowed “bald eagle” evidence as early
as the 17th Century, and American courts followed suit,
adopting it through the common law.30 Though it was
popular and, frankly, the only real evidence in a paternity
suit, courts understood that it was ripe for abuse.31 Some
jurisdictions went as far as to ban “bald eagle” evidence
altogether.32 The Maine Supreme Court reasoned that:
[w]hile it may be a well-known physiological
fact that peculiarities of form, feature, and
personal traits are oftentimes transmitted
from parent to child, yet it is equally true as a
matter of common knowledge that during the
first few weeks, or even months, of a child’s
existence, it has that peculiar immaturity of
features which characterize it as an infant,
and that it changes often and very much in
looks and appearance during that period.
Resemblance can then be readily imagined. . .
. And in a trial in bastardy proceedings the
mere fact that a resemblance is claimed would
In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (N.Y. 1930).
See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 16.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 16-17.
31 Id. at 17.
32 Id.
25
26
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be too likely to lead captive the imagination of
the jury, and they would fancy they could see
points of resemblance between the child and
the putative father.33
Today, the admittance of “bald eagle” evidence varies widely
by jurisdiction. For example, in Tennessee, paternity cases
require a genetic test to establish parentage, except in rare
cases,34 so “bald eagle” evidence is generally not used.

C. BLOOD GROUP TESTING
The discovery and proliferation of safe and easy blood
group testing in Europe changed paternity actions forever.35
But, unfortunately, American courts were slow to adopt
blood group paternity tests and entirely excluded them at
first.36 Though physicians discovered the science behind the
tests in 1900, U.S. courts did not admit them until the
1930s.37 The tests were seen as expert testimony and
required an expert to testify along with the evidence.38 It
wasn’t until the 1945 California case of Berry v. Chaplin,
involving Hollywood film star Charlie Chaplin, that the test
was evidence on its own.39
Blood group testing is not accurate for the individual,
but to what blood type the tested person is.40 It tests for the
father’s blood group—A, B, AB, or O—and tests to see
whether the child’s blood type is compatible with the
putative father’s.41 Suppose the putative father’s blood type
is incompatible. In that case, the test can reasonably exclude
him as the biological father, but the test cannot conclude a
person is the child’s father based solely on their blood type.42
That is why this sort of test is considered “exclusionary.”43

Clark v. Bradstreet, 15 A. 56, 56-57 (Me. 1888).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-112 (2021).
35 See Shapiro, supra note 5 at 19-20.
36 Id. at 20.
37 Id. at 24.
38 Id. at 23.
39 Id. at 21.
40 Id. at 20.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 21.
43 Id.
33
34
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Today, because of the ease and accuracy of DNA tests, this
test is rarely used.

D. DNA TESTING
DNA was discovered in 1953 by James Watson,
Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins, and Rosalind Franklin.44 Its
discovery gave humanity—but most notably for this paper,
courts—the ability to distinguish between individuals except
identical twins.45 As safe, accurate, and cost-effective tests
became more available, courts began to allow it as evidence,
much like their allowance of blood group tests.46 Thus, by the
early 1990s, the acceptance of DNA profiling was universal.47
One of the only issues with DNA profiling is the chain
of custody, though, in paternity actions, this is of little
concern. In criminal cases, where the standard is beyond a
reasonable doubt, the chain of custody potentially means the
difference between a conviction and an acquittal. Some
courts early on were reluctant to place faith in evidence
given, unaccompanied, to a lab and then trust the results
when they came back. This process was never much of an
issue in paternity actions since most jurisdictions have a
standard of preponderance of the evidence or by clear and
convincing evidence.48 Tennessee’s standard is by a
preponderance of the evidence.49

III. CURRENT TENNESSEE LAW
To legally establish paternity in Tennessee, a party
must file a complaint to establish parentage with a court of
competent jurisdiction.50 A party may indeed file an action
James Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins, and Rosalind Franklin,
SCIENCE HISTORY INS. (Dec. 4, 2017), available at https://www.
sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/james-watson-francis-crick-mauricewilkins-and-rosalind-franklin.
45 See Shapiro, supra note 5 at 29.
46 Id. at 38.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(b)(3) (2021).
50 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-305 (2021).
44
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before the child is born, but only certain aspects of the case
may happen before birth.51 One of those aspects is “the
performance of genetic testing.”52 Though this implies the
legislature’s intent to allow prenatal paternity tests, there is
no evidence that any court in Tennessee has ever ordered
such a test. There is only one appellate opinion that even
deals with prenatal paternity tests.
In In re Madilene G.R., the Tennessee Court of
Appeals first encountered prenatal paternity testing.53 One
of the grounds alleged at the underlying trial to terminate
the putative father’s rights was that he failed “to pay a
reasonable share of prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses
. . . .”54 As part of the abandonment ground, the mother also
alleged the father failed “to make reasonable payments
toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4)
months immediately preceding the birth of the child.”55 The
Rutherford County Chancery Court terminated the father’s
rights based on this second ground.56 On appeal, the putative
father argued that he wasn’t sure he was the father until the
child’s birth.57 The mother asserted that the father offered to
take a paternity test, but he never took one.58 In response,
the Court of Appeals briefly touched on prenatal paternity
tests in dicta: “if Father was justifiably suspicious of
Mother’s assertion that he was the child’s father, he and
Mother should have pursued the appropriate prenatal [sic]
testing, if available, provided prenatal paternity testing is
available and safe for mother and the unborn child.”59 This
opinion shows that, at least at the intermediate appellate
level, Tennessee courts are open to the idea of prenatal
testing as long as it is safe for the mother and unborn child.

A. PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY

Id.
Id.
53 In re Madilene G.R., No. M2012–01178–COA–R3–PT, 2013 WL 139564,
at *1, *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013).
54 Id. at *2.
55 Id. at *4.
56 Id. at *3.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at *7.
51
52
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Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-318 governs
the putative father registry.60 The Division of Vital Records
at the State Department of Health maintains the putative
father registry. It lists all court-ordered legitimations and
putative fathers who have filed with the registry before, or
less than thirty days after, the child’s birth and intends to
seek legitimation of that child.61 The purpose of the registry
is to notify putative fathers if the child is pending adoption
placement or the mother’s rights are pending termination.62
Additionally, at legitimation proceedings, the registry can be
used as evidence.63 Though the registry has little value under
Tennessee law, other states have strict requirements around
their registries and establishing paternity.

B. PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
However, this presumption of legitimacy still exists,
though it is more refined and less draconian.64 Under
Tennessee law:
(a) A man is rebuttably presumed to be the
father of a child if:
(1) The man and the child’s mother are
married or have been married to each other
and the child is born during the marriage or
within three hundred (300) days after the
marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
declaration of invalidity, or divorce;
(2) Before the child’s birth, the man and the
mother have attempted to marry each other in
compliance with the law, although the
attempted marriage is or could be declared
illegal, void and voidable;
(3) After the child’s birth, the man and the
mother have married or attempted to marry
each other in compliance with the law
although such marriage is or could be declared
illegal, void, or voidable; and:
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (2021).
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Dahl, supra note 17 at 699.
60
61
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(A) The man has acknowledged his paternity
of the child in a writing filed under the
putative father registry established by the
department of children services, pursuant to §
36-2-318;
(B) The man has consented in writing to be
named the child’s father on the birth
certificate; or
(C) The man is obligated to support the child
under a written voluntary promise or by court
order;
(4) While the child is under the age of majority,
the man receives the child into the man’s home
and openly holds the child out as the man’s
natural child; or
(5) Genetic tests have been administered as
provided in § 24-7-112, an exclusion has not
occurred, and the test results show a
statistical probability of parentage of ninetyfive percent (95%) or greater.65
In most states, there are two affirmative defenses
against paternity: (1) incapability and (2) failure of a DNA
test.66 Incapability is a modernization of a four seas test of
old—if a husband can prove he could not conceive that child,
either by distance or by medical circumstances, he may rebut
the presumption.67 The standard to which the husband must
prove varies by jurisdiction, but Tennessee’s standard is by
a preponderance of the evidence.68
Until 1997, only the legal parents or the child could
question the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during
a marriage.69 Thus, a putative father had no right to question
the presumption.70 Today, however, Tennessee time-bars
such claims of parentage after twelve months if the legal
parents were married and living together at the time of
conception and remained so through the petition’s filing.71
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304 (2021).
See Shapiro, supra note 5 at 15.
67 Id.
68 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(b)(3) (2021).
69 Evans v. Steelman, 970 S.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Tenn. 1998).
70 Id.
71 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(b)(2)(A) (2021).
65
66
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C. PRENATAL SUPPORT
“The purpose of the paternity statute is to require a
biological father to support his child.”72 Unfortunately,
Tennessee has no firm mechanism for prenatal child support
despite this aim and willful prenatal non-support being an
element of a ground for termination of parental rights.73
Instead, the state relies on the mother and putative father—
or fathers, depending on circumstances—to find a solution
without court intervention. If the father refuses to help, the
mother may only pursue termination once the child is born.
Other states allow courts to order prenatal child
support or order the father to bear some pregnancy costs.
Depending on how you read Coxwell v. Matthews, Georgia
either mandates prenatal child support during pregnancy or
allows for mothers to be reimbursed for it after the fact.74 In
Wisconsin,75 Oregon,76 and several other states, the mother
can recover birth costs after the child is born. Accordingly,
pregnancy-cost legislation seems to be the current national
trend. Just a few months ago, Utah passed a law mandating
that fathers pay half of the mother’s pregnancy costs.77

1. PRENATAL SUPPORT IN TERMINATION ACTIONS
As mentioned above, failing to pay prenatal expenses
was once ground to terminate parental rights.78 Until 2019,
the Tennessee Code Annotated provided that the court could
terminate a putative father’s rights if “[t]he person . . . failed,
See Shell v. Law, 935 S.W.2d 402, 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
(citation omitted).
73 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (2021).
74 See Coxwell v. Matthews, 435 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Ga. 1993).
75 Your Guide to Repaying Birth Costs, WIS. DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, available at https://dcf.wisconsin.gov/files/publications/pdf/
11777.pdf (last visited Jul. 27, 2021).
76 FAQs: Establishing Paternity, OR. HEALTH AUTHORITY, available at
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/BIRTHDEATHCERTIFICATES/CHANG
EVITALRECORDS/Pages/paternityfaqs.aspx (last visited Jul. 27, 2021).
77 Sophia Eppolito, New Utah Law Requires Dads to Pay Prenatal Child
Support, WANE (Apr. 5, 2021, 5:57pm), available at https://www.wane.
com/news/utah-dads-to-be-required-to-pay-half-of-pregnancy-costs/.
78 In re Madilene G.R., No. M2012–01178–COA–R3–PT, 2013 WL 139564,
at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013).
72
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without good cause or excuse, to pay a reasonable share of
prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses involving the birth
of the child in accordance with the person’s financial means
promptly upon the person’s receipt of notice of the child’s
impending birth[.]”79 Though petitions, like in In re Madilene
G.R., alleged there is no evidence that any court ever
terminated a father’s parental rights on this ground, the
court never overturned.80 Perhaps courts found this ground
difficult to enforce when they could not safely ascertain the
paternity of the child. A bill by state Representative Mike
Carter and state Senator Ferrell Haile deleted this provision
in 2019,81 and, aside from abandonment, there is currently
no termination ground dealing with a father’s prenatal
activity.82
Abandonment is another termination ground under
Tennessee law.83 Abandonment of a child occurs when the
“biological or legal father has either failed to visit or failed to
make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s
mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding
the birth of the child.”84 Section 36-1-102(1)(I) further states,
“it shall be a defense to abandonment for failure to visit or
failure to support that a parent or guardian’s failure to visit
or support was not willful. The parent or guardian shall bear
the burden of proof that the failure to visit or support was
not willful. Such defense must be established by a
preponderance of [the] evidence.”85 Before a 2018
amendment, this code section required a willfulness finding
along with a finding that the father’s actions were not

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(i) (2013) (repealed by 2019 Pub.
Acts, c. 36, § 3, eff. July 1, 2019).
80 H.B. 287, 111 H.J. 717 (2019) (Statement of Rep. Carter). See In re
Kah’nyia J., No. M2017–00712–COA–R3–PT, 2018 WL 2025217, *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App., Apr. 30, 2018) (Trial court terminated father’s rights for failure
to provide prenatal support but this ground was overturned on appeal.).
81 Act to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 36, Chapter 1, Part 1;
Title 36, Chapter 2 and Section 37-1-102, relative to adoption, S.B. 207,
111th Gen. Assemb. § 1 (2019). See also Act to amend Tennessee Code
Annotated, Title 36, Chapter 1, Part 1; Title 36, Chapter 2 and Section 371-102, relative to adoption, H.B. 287, 111th Gen. Assemb. § 1 (2019).
82 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (2021).
83 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(1) (2021).
84 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) (2021).
85 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (2021).
79
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reasonable.86 The current statute moved willfulness from an
element of abandonment to an affirmative defense.

IV. WHY TEST PRENATALLY?
So, if the General Assembly has already passed
legislation allowing prenatal paternity tests87 and the courts
are generally open to allowing them,88 why aren’t they a
regular facet of Tennessee paternity actions? Tennessee
courts’ reluctance is right in the reasoning in Madilene
G.R.—they are afraid prenatal paternity tests are too
invasive and unsafe for both the mother and the child.89

A. PRENATAL TESTS ARE SAFE, NON-INVASIVE, AND
COST-EFFECTIVE
Until recently, prenatal paternity testing required
amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling.90 These are the
same procedures used to test for genetic disorders such as
down syndrome, but they involve womb intrusion and carry
a small risk of miscarriage.91 Though the benefits have
always been high, the costs outweighed them.
With recent DNA technology advancements, safer
and more practical paternity tests are available for children
before they are born.92 These tests only require a blood
sample from the mother and the putative father, and the lab
can then extract fragments of the child’s DNA from the
mother’s blood.93 In addition, some newer tests don’t even
require blood from the putative father, requiring only a

In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Tenn. 2003). See also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-1-102 (2018).
87 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-305 (2021).
88 In re Madilene G.R., No. M2012–01178–COA–R3–PT, at *7 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan 10, 2013).
89 Id.
90 Andrew Pollack, Before Birth, Dad’s ID, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 2012, at
B1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/health/paternityblood-tests-that-work-early-in-a-pregnancy.html.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
86
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mouth swab instead.94 Finally, the test compares these
fragments to the putative father’s DNA, much like a postbirth test.95
Prenatal DNA tests are also becoming cost-effective.
Though initially prohibitively expensive, their costs have
come down and are nearly comparable with their post-birth
counterparts. The DNA Diagnostics Center (“DDC”), the
company responsible for the most recent generation of—and
the only one accredited with the American Association of
Blood Banks—non-invasive prenatal paternity tests, prices
their services at $1,699.00 per test.96 Other prenatal tests are
even lower—as little as $500.00—but these sometimes must
be taken later in the pregnancy, or the company may not
have the same procedures in place to make the sample
admissible.97 In the future, the cost will very likely come
down, just as traditional DNA-test costs once did.
Finally, Prenatal DNA tests are accurate. The
American Pregnancy Association, an endorser of the DDC,
claims the non-invasive tests have a 99.9% accuracy rate.98
Though disputed, academic papers as far back as 2012
corroborate this claim.99 Because the accuracy rate is so high,
this test is just as accurate as post-birth paternity tests.

B. SUPPORT DURING PREGNANCY
If the baby will be here in nine months, 100 what is the
point of going to court to establish paternity before birth?
There are valid reasons for both the mother and the father
to seek prenatal paternity. The largest of these for the
mother is child support during pregnancy. Under current
Non-Invasive Prenatal Paternity Test, DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR.,
https://dnacenter.com/paternity-testing/non-invasive-prenatal-paternitytesting/?gphone=1-800-798-0580&gdnis=0580 (last visited Jul. 23, 2021).
95 Id.
96 Non-Invasive Prenatal Paternity Test from DDC Accredited by AABB,
DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR., https://dnacenter.com/blog/blog-dna-diagnosticscenter-secures-aabb-accreditation-for-its-certainty-non-invasiveprenatal-paternity-test/ (last visited Jul. 23, 2021).
97 Id.
98
DNA
Paternity
Test,
AM.
PREGNANCY
ASS’N.,
https://
americanpregnancy.org/paternity-tests/dna-paternity-test/ (last visited
Jul. 23, 2021).
99 Pollack, supra note 91. See also Xin Guo et al., A Noninvasive Test to
Determine Paternity in Pregnancy, 366 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1743 (2012).
100 ROBERTS, supra note 2.
94
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law, there is no mechanism for court-ordered prenatal child
support. If the father does not give prenatal child support,
the mother has no immediate recourse. However, after the
child’s birth, she can petition the court to terminate the
father’s rights, but his non-support will only be a termination
ground if she can prove it was “willful.” Without prenatal
paternity tests, this is a high bar. Fathers can argue that
their non-support was not willful because they did not know
they were the father.
Court-ordered prenatal child support would level the
playing field. No longer would the mother be saddled with
the entire pregnancy cost, but, rather, the father would pay
some reasonable amount to offset the costs of those exceeding
the mother’s normal cost of living. This paper is not calling
for entire pregnancy costs to be paid by men. Instead, this is
an egalitarian argument born out of fairness as it took two
to tango, i.e., make the child,101 so both parties ought to bear
some of the cost.
Georgia Supreme Court Justice Leah Sears said it
best in her concurrence to Coxwell v. Matthews:
It is generally understood that proper prenatal
care is critical to assist a woman in meeting
the demands of pregnancy, labor, and
childbirth and to ensure that the young are
protected from birth complications and
abnormalities. If a child’s mother has no
prenatal care, that child’s life can be an uphill
climb. He or she has a greater risk of mental
retardation, cerebral palsy, and even death.
Special education and health care services for
these children are costly to taxpayers. A
healthy pregnancy and birth are essential for
a healthy child. Therefore, the conclusion is
inescapable that the duty to provide for a
child’s
maintenance
and
protection
incorporates expenses incurred by the mother
due to pregnancy and birth.102

C. PARENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
101
102

ROBERTS, supra note 2.
Coxwell v. Matthews, 435 S.E.2d 33, 35 (Ga. 1993).
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Another reason to find out prenatal paternity is that
it keeps parents, particularly fathers, accountable through
the pregnancy. Just by the nature of childbirth, women have
a nine-month head start in taking parental responsibility.
There is an exacerbation in this gap when the mother has
had multiple sexual partners, and the child’s father is not
conclusively known. Under the current system, it is unlikely
that a handful of men will wait around for nine months to
see who the father is. It is even less likely that any of those
same men will offer prenatal child support if there is even a
chance someone else could be the father.
By ordering prenatal paternity tests and establishing
parentage before the child is born, courts can sort out this
mess beforehand. The court would not have to wait months
for the child’s birth when the biological father could be
providing prenatal child support, and other men could move
on with their lives. Additionally, shortening the time
between conception and establishment of parentage lessens
the chance that a father moves out of the court’s jurisdiction.
A father moving out of the court’s jurisdiction could
complicate many things, including service of process and
enforcement of court orders.103 By establishing parentage as
soon as seven weeks after conception,104 courts can
considerably lessen this possibility.
Holding fathers accountable during pregnancy may
also make fathers more likely to stick around long-term.
Perhaps when fathers invest financially in their children,
they may also become emotionally invested. This outcome
shows that the change in the law should incentivize more
fathers to be active in their children’s lives.

D. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRENATAL TESTING
It seems the primary argument against prenatal
paternity tests is their tie to the slow judicial system.
Establishing paternity, prenatally or post-birth can be
A discussion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act is out of the scope of this paper, but by “complicat[ing
the] . . . enforcement of orders,” the author comments more on local
reluctance to enforce a foreign jurisdiction’s orders rather than a legal
barrier.
104 Prenatal Paternity Test, supra note 95.
103
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cumbersome and time-consuming. It’s not the testing
center’s fault, as the DDC has a turn-around time of about
seven days.105 Instead, it is an issue with the courts
themselves. Suppose either party tries to act in bad faith by
avoiding service or needlessly complicating the paternity
action. In that case, the process could easily stretch past the
time frame of a human gestation cycle. This case is a valid
argument and one that there is no easy solution provided.
Like many other time-sensitive legal questions, prenatal
paternity actions will require trust in the efficiency of the
court and good faith from all involved parties.
Another argument against prenatal testing is its
limitations. Presently, the DDC’s flagship test, “the
Certainty,” cannot differentiate between closely related
potential fathers.106 Additionally, women having multiple
births cannot have the test accurately performed.107 Postbirth paternity tests do not have these limitations, so
detractors usually argue prenatal tests are not as useful as
traditional post-birth testing. This paper is not arguing that
prenatal tests should usurp post-birth tests, only that they
would be helpful in the limited uses involving multiple
partners who refuse to support the woman during her
pregnancy. Additionally, the court may follow up with a
paternity test post-birth to confirm the results if they feel so
inclined.
Finally, the cost is still high. As stated before, the cost
of the top-of-the-line test is $1699.108 Though a Google search
of prenatal paternity tests yields a plethora of options, some
as low as $900, admissibility could become difficult based
solely on the fact that the other tests do not have the
endorsements or backing as DDC. The court could become
wary of the chain of custody. This paper’s proposed solution
accounts for this. First, as competitors enter the market and
gain more trust and recognition, costs will come down. This
paper argues that Tennessee should be ahead of the curve in
its legislation. Second, because the standard for proving
paternity under this proposed statutory regime is by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing

Id.
Id.
107 Id.
108 DDC Accredited, supra note 97.
105
106
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evidence, the chain of custody needs to only rise to that
standard, too.

V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
This section sets out specific policy changes and their
reasoning and predicts how they will interact with each
other.

A. RECOGNIZE PRENATAL PATERNITY TESTS IN THE
TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED
As discussed in earlier sections, non-invasive
prenatal paternity tests are safe and will soon be costeffective. Though their uses may be limited, they could
bolster future family jurisprudence. Encouraging their use
would put Tennessee ahead of the curve on this issue.
To make this happen, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 24-7-112 should be amended by adding a subsection
(c) and inserting the following language:
In any proceeding in which the parentage of an
unborn child is at issue, unless the individual
has good cause, the court shall order the
parties to submit to a non-invasive, prenatal
paternity test upon the request of any party if
the request is supported by an affidavit of the
party making the request to the same
standards as a traditional genetic test under
this chapter. There shall be no difference in
pleading between a prenatal and post-birth
test.
(1) On the motion of any party, or by order of
the court, the father shall submit to another
paternity test per subsection (a) within one
hundred twenty (120) days after the child’s
birth to confirm the parentage of the child.
Under this statutory regime, this does not take away from
the court’s ability to order traditional post-birth paternity
tests. Instead, it only emphasizes and codifies the existence
and reliability of prenatal paternity tests. Additionally, this
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statute requires the same level of pleadings and standards
as a post-birth paternity test. Finally, if either party or the
court remains not entirely convinced, they can always
submit to another paternity test after the child's birth to
confirm their parentage.

B. ESTABLISH PRENATAL CHILD SUPPORT FOR MOTHERS
Establishing prenatal child support for mothers is the
primary driver of prenatal paternity tests. Rather than
concoct some pre-birth child support schemes like the state’s
normal child support system, this paper argues for simple
value exchange. After establishing paternity, the court
would be free to order prenatal child support based on factors
such as the father’s income, the mother’s income, and other
reasonable factors the court deems appropriate. A test of
reasonability based on the father's and mother's
circumstances would govern any past child support. If the
mother believes the father is not paying or giving enough
child support, she may ask the court to find him in contempt.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101 should
be amended by adding subsection (n) and inserting the
following:
When paternity is established for a child born
or to be born to parents unwed to each other,
the court may order for the suitable prenatal,
natal, and postnatal support of the child and
mother by the father or out of the father's
property, according to the nature of the case
and the circumstances of the parties, the
modification of said order shall remain under
the court's jurisdiction. If paternity is
established after the birth of the child but
before the child is two (2) years old, the court
may order the father to reimburse the mother
for reasonable prenatal, natal, and postnatal
expenses.
The legislature should make further adjustments to the
requisite statutes to ensure the desired effect.
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C. ESTABLISH LIMITED PRENATAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
FOR BIOLOGICAL FATHERS
Once paternity has been established, and the
pregnancy has progressed past the federally protected
window for abortions, fathers should have limited rights to
seek good-faith injunctions for a mother’s behavior
dangerous to the unborn child. For example, drug and
alcohol use harms unborn children. The effects of said use
may very likely result in a severe abuse finding against the
mother,109 which sometimes relieves the Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services from their reasonable
efforts' requirement. In addition, it is an automatic
termination ground should the mother have a terminationof-parental-rights’ action brought against her.110 Further, if
the father knew of these actions and willfully chose not to
prevent them, he can also have a severe abuse finding
against him.111 An injunction against prenatal alcohol and
drug use would provide a father with the tools to do
something other than sitting idly by during pregnancy.
This right has the propensity to be abused and should
therefore be extraordinarily limited. Though the child's
wellbeing is important, respecting the mother’s autonomy is
just as vital to both the mother's rights and the statute's
constitutionality. A court may very well view this right as a
restriction on abortion, meaning the statute must conform
with Roe v. Wade112 and Planned Parenthood of Southern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.113 That is why the right cannot be
established or exercised before the unborn child’s viability.
On the more extreme, yet unfortunately common, end
of the spectrum, abusive relationships tend to escalate
during pregnancy.114 This “right” has the potential to
escalate these relationships even further, as well as give
abusers a new tool to control their victims. The father’s good
faith is an important factor in this proposed statute and is a
necessary finding by the court in applying it. It would not
only be wrong but judicially irresponsible to allow a father to
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(27) (2021).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166 (2021).
111 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(27) (2021).
112 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
113 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
114 Eppolito, supra note 78.
109
110
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unnecessarily restrict a mother’s autonomy because she is
pregnant with his child.
The legislature should establish a new code section,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-323, titled “Limited
Prenatal Rights of Biological Fathers” and insert the
following:
(a) On the good-faith showing that an unborn
child is at the point of viability and that the
mother’s willful use of harmful substances
could cause, or is causing, the unborn child
immediate and irreparable harm, an
established biological father may seek an
injunction to the mother’s use of harmful
substances.
(b) If this injunction is granted and
subsequently violated, the father shall be
granted primary custody of the child upon
birth.
(c) Any action arising out of this Section must
be made by clear and convincing evidence.

D. REINSTATE NONPAYMENT OF PRENATAL EXPENSES
AS A GROUND FOR TERMINATION
The reinstatement of nonpayment of prenatal
expenses as a ground for termination has less to do with
prenatal paternity tests and more to do with rectifying a
change to the law made in 2019.115 Though prenatal tests are
not the reason, they make this law more viable. Before 2019,
courts could terminate the biological father’s rights if he
“failed to pay a reasonable share of prenatal, natal, and
postnatal expenses . . . .”116 Even so, because of the courts’
reluctance to order prenatal paternity tests, a father’s rights
were never successfully terminated under this ground.117
Fathers could, at most, argue that they didn’t know the child
was theirs during the pregnancy and, at least, force the
mother to frontload the prenatal and natal costs.
2019 Pub. Acts, c. 36, § 3, eff. July 1, 2019.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(i) (2013) (repealed by 2019 Pub.
Acts, c. 36, § 3, eff. July 1, 2019).
117 H.B. 287, 111 H.J. 717 (2019) (Statement of Rep. Carter).
115
116
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As it stands now, of course, the mother must pay her
own natal and prenatal costs with no involuntary help from
the father. Reinstating this termination ground would
encourage biological fathers—now fully aware of their
paternity thanks to prenatal paternity tests—to give
prenatal child support to the child’s mother. Therefore, the
Legislature should amend the Tennessee Code Annotated
section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(i) by deleting the current text and
instead inserting the following:
The person has failed, without good cause or
excuse, to pay a reasonable share of prenatal,
natal, and postnatal expenses involving the
birth of the child in accordance with the
person’s financial means promptly upon the
person’s receipt of notice of the child’s
impending birth and, if parentage is disputed,
after paternity has been established per § 247-112.

E. THE BIG PICTURE
This statutory regime incentivizes establishing
parentage, ordering prenatal child support, and setting the
foundation for a better quality of life for the unborn child. It
gives mothers access to prenatal child support they might
not otherwise have. It gives fathers the ability to document
and intervene when a mother’s drug or alcohol abuse puts
his unborn child in danger. Most of all, it encourages both
parents to act in their child’s best interests during
pregnancy.

VI. CONCLUSION
“[I]f truth were everywhere to be shown, a scarlet
letter would blaze forth on many a bosom . . . .”118 Children
born to unwed parents or as a result of adultery should have
the same opportunities as those born to stable families.
Tennessee law should incentivize cohesive families and
stable relationships, and children should have every
opportunity to flourish. Codifying prenatal paternity testing
118
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and the other changes this paper has argued for would
further these end goals.

